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Abstract
Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource
allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Specifically, we assume
each agent can only receive allocations from a subset of the total supply for each resource.
Such constraints often arise from location constraints (e.g. among all of the volunteer nurses,
only a subset of them can work at hospital A due to commute constraints. So hospital A can
only receive allocations of volunteers from a subset of the total supply). We propose a new
mechanism called Group Dominant Resource Fairness which determines the allocations by
solving a small number of linear programs. The proposed method satisfies Pareto optimality,
envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and under an additional mild assumption, also proportion-
ality. We show numerically that our method scales better to large problems than alternative
approaches. Finally, although motivated by the problem of medical resource allocation in a
pandemic, our mechanism can be applied more broadly to resource allocation under Leontief
utilities with external constraints.
1 Introduction
The recent COVID-19 pandemic has brought forward a number of questions that are particularly
relevant to the operations research community. While infectious disease spread modeling and
resource demand forecasting provide guidance for the policy making process, an equally important
and often overlooked problem is the effective and fair allocation of resources, such as volunteer
medical workers, ventilators, emergency field hospital beds, personal protective equipment, etc.
There are several challenges unique to the medical resource allocation problem in the face of an
infectious disease outbreak. First, utilities from different types of resources are not additive nor
linear. For example, when there are enough nurses but not enough doctors, the marginal utility of
having one additional nurse on staff is next to none. Second, not all resources are accessible to
all hospitals / organizations (agents). For instance, the home location of each volunteer medical
worker largely affects where she can commute to work; thus, she can only be assigned to agents
within her commutable radius. One can also think of this as modeling the substitute effect, where
some agents might be indifferent to a set of resources. Finally, agents have different capacities (big
medical centers versus small hospitals) and are in different stress levels (hospitals in an epicenter
versus rural areas with few cases), so they naturally have different priorities over the resources.
Another setting that has the above characteristics is compute resource sharing with sub-types.
For example, suppose a compute server has several compute nodes, and there are different types
of GPU/CPU on the various nodes (e.g. NVIDIA vs. AMD GPU, size of RAM on the GPU card,
Intel vs AMD CPU, etc). Some users might be looking for a specific hardware configuration while
others might be less selective.
In this paper, we propose a new market mechanism that tackles the three challenges outlined
above, and achieves desirable fairness properties including Pareto optimaility, envy freeness, and
strategyproofness. Under mild conditions, our mechanism also satisfies Proportionality. In our
numerical experiments, we demonstrate that compared to the Maximum Nash Welfare (MNW)
approach, our mechanism is cheaper to compute (sometimes significantly) and enjoys theoretical
properties that MNW does not have.
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1.1 Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we summarize related literature. In
Section 3, we formally formulate our problem. In Section 4, we describe our proposed mechanism in
detail and prove the four desiderata. In Section 5 we numerically compare our proposed mechanism
to the MNW approach.
2 Related work
There has been a flurry of recent papers coming out of the operations research, statistics, and
computer science communities addressing various aspects of the pandemic. We focus on literature
that deals with emergency resource allocations in the aftermath of a pandemic, as well as general
fair division technique that are most relevant in our setting.
2.1 Emergency resource allocation
Much work has been done to address the various supply shortages caused by COVID-19. Many
studied medical resource allocations from a qualitative perspective, addressing ethical and medical
questions in a pandemic [2, 8, 16]. From a mechanism design view point, [11] proposed a mechanism
for allocation of public goods that are capacity constrained due to social distancing protocols.
They followed a similar setup to us where resource types that are part of the same meta-type are
substitutes for each other. However they used the meta-type setup to model the constraint where
each agent wants at most one unit of each meta-type resource to prevent imbalanced allocation.
Our work on the other hand focuses on modeling the location/external constraints using the meta-
type setup, places no limit on how much of each resource an agent can receive, and uses Leontief
utility function to prevent pathologically imbalanced allocations. Furthermore, they focused on
achieving a market clearing mechanism and did not address strategyproofness explicitly.
[13] studied the allocation of ventilators under a stochastic optimization framework. The
objective was to minimize the expected number of shortages in ventilators while also taking into
account of the cost of transporting ventilators. [12, 15] provided guidelines for deciding whether a
patient should be allocated a ventilator. [18] combined influenza modeling techniques with robust
optimization to handle workforce shortfall in a pandemic. [17] modeled the deteriorating health of
victims using a stochastic model and optimized for the expected number of deaths. [1] studied the
tradeoff between building redundant capacity and using mutual aid. [3] proposed considerations
for physicians when deciding if a patient should be allocated an ICU unit. All of these works focus
on optimizing some objective function but do not address fairness properties. Our work serves as
a complement to the existing work.
2.2 General resource allocation
Under a fairly general class of utility functions including the Leontief utility, computing market
equilibrium under the fisher market setting (divisible goods) can be done using an Eisenberg-Gale
(EG) convex program [7]. Market equilibrium solutions satisfy Pareto optimality, proportionality,
and envy-freeness. It’s also known that EG convex program is implicitly maximizing Nash welfare,
which is the product of the agents’ utilities. However, MNW is known to not be strategyproof,
and can be computationally expensive for large problems. For Leontief utility, [10] introduced
the Dominant Resource Fairness allocation mechanism which in addition to the three properties
satisfied by market equilibrium solutions, is also strategyproof. Later [14] extended the setting to
allow weights as well as zero demand over some resources for some agents, while maintaining all
four properties. Our problem does not fit into their setting directly because of the group structures
of our demand: two agents might both demand the same type of resource, but each is allowed to
only receive allocation from two different, and potentially intersecting subsets of the same resource
pool. Furthermore, as we discuss later in the paper, a naive adaptation of this approach does not
yield a Pareto optimal mechanism.
For indivisible resources, [6] showed that maximizing Nash welfare under the indivisible setting
satisfies envy freeness up to one resource and has nice guarantees on the Max-Min Share ratio.
Although exact market equilibrium might not exist in indivisible settings, [4] showed that a close
approximation of it exists in the unweighted, binary allocation case. This was later put to practice
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for course allocation in [5]. However the theory does not provide useful approximation bounds
when assignments are not binary (e.g.: each student only needs one seat from each class, but each
hospital may require hundreds of doctors). Furthermore, the existing computational approaches do
not scale to the size of the problems encountered in pandemic situations, where tens of thousands
of volunteers need to be allocated to hundreds of hospitals.
3 Problem formulation
For the remainder of the paper we use the local medical personnel allocation as a running example,
even though other resource allocation problems can be formulated as well. We group resources
into meta-types: volunteer doctors, nurses, ventilators, emergency field hospital beds, etc. Within
each meta-type (e.g., doctors), we have types (e.g., doctors from the Bronx, doctors from Brooklyn,
doctors from Manhattan, etc.). We assume that demands are given over meta-types (e.g., a hospital
is indifferent to where doctors assigned to it come from). However, each agent sometimes can only
receive allocation from a subset of the resources in a meta-type because of constraints such as
location (e.g., a hospital in Manhattan might only accept volunteer doctors from the Bronx and
Manhattan because those who live outside of these areas have a prohibitively long commute time
to get to this hospital). We refer to such subsets of each meta-type as the agent’s demand groups.
We use Ω1,Ω2, · · · ,ΩL to denote the meta-types. Each meta-type Ωl is a set that contains
resource types which belong to it. We assume that Ωi ∩ Ωj = ∅ for any i, j pair such that
i, j ∈ [L] = {1, . . . , L} and i 6= j. We denote R = ∪l∈[L]Ωl; namely, R is the set of all resource
types and each resource type belongs to only one meta-type. We use N to denote the set of agents.
Let m = |R| be the total number of resource types, and n = |N | be the total number of agents.
Use Sr to denote the supply of resource type r. We assume that the supplies are normalized
within each meta-type: ∑
r∈Ωl
Sr = 1 ∀l ∈ [L].
Each agent i ∈ N submits a similarly normalized demand vector [di1, . . . , diL] where dil denotes
the fraction of available units among meta-type l that agent i needs to finish one unit of task.
Additionally, each agent also submits a group structure constraint in the form of a set of accepted
types (i.e. a group) for each meta-type Gi = {gil ⊆ Ωl : l ∈ [L], dil > 0}, where gil ⊆ Ωl is the subset
of resource types belonging to meta-type l that agent i accepts. Note that we exclude meta-types
that the agent does not need to simplify notations later on. Intuitively, the introduction of meta-
types models the substitution effects, and the introduction of groups models the heterogeneous
constraints. When i is clear from the context, we sometimes use gl instead of gil to simplify the
notation.
Using the above definitions, we further define
l∗i := arg max
l∈[L]
dil d
i
∗ := d
i
l∗i
Namely, l∗i is the meta-type from which agent i demands the biggest proportional share, di∗. We
refer to l∗i as the dominant resource meta-type for agent i.
For each meta-type l,
∑
r∈gil
xir is the fraction of the total supply of meta-type l that is assigned
to agent i, where xir is the contribution from each individual resource type that is accepted by
agent i. We use xi to denote the assignment vector of agent i and x to denote the assignment
matrix that encodes the allocations vectors of all agents. We define the utility for each agent under
a given assignment vector xi as:
ui := min
gl∈Gi
{
1
dil
∑
r∈gl
xir
}
. (1)
Since agent i needs dil proportion of the supply units from each meta-type l to finish a unit of
task, ui is the number of tasks agent i can finish given allocation vector xi. This utility measure
is called the Leontief utility.
We also assume that each agent i has a weight wi which measures the operational capac-
ity/importance of the agent. A fair allocation of resources should take into account the different
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Figure 1: All three hospitals can accept both types of doctors. However, hospitals I and II can
only accept Nurse type C, while hospital III accepts both types of nurses.
weights. For example, big hospitals in heavier hit areas should be allocated more resources com-
pared to small clinics in places with low population density. We assume WLOG that the weights
sum to one, namely,
∑
i∈N wi = 1.
We now give a concrete example, which is also illustrated in Figure 1.
Example 1. Consider a case of three agents (hospitals) {1, 2, 3} and two resource meta-types.
The first meta-type consists of two types of doctors (resource A,B), and the second consists of
two types of nurses(resource C,D): Ω1 = {A,B},Ω2 = {C,D}. The normalized weights for the
three hospitals are: w1 = w2 = 14 , w3 =
1
2 . Let the supply for each type of doctor and nurse
be 500. Thus, the total available units of each meta-type is 500 + 500 = 1000, and Sr = 5001000 =
1
2 ∀r ∈ {A,B,C,D}. All three hospitals can accept both types of doctors but hospitals 1, 2 can only
accept nurse type C while the third hospital only accepts nurse type D: G1 = {g11 = {A,B}, g12 =
{C}}, G2 = {g21 = {A,B}, g22 = {C}}, G3 = {g31 = {A,B}, g32 = {D}}. Hospital 1 demands 4
doctors and 1 nurse for every unit of task. Hospital 2 demands 1 doctor and 4 nurses for every
unit of task. The third hospital demands 1 doctor and 1 nurse for every unit of task. Since the total
units of supply for each meta-type is 1000, d1 = [ 41000 ,
1
1000 ]; d
2 = [ 11000 ,
4
1000 ], d
3 = [ 11000 ,
1
1000 ].
3.1 Fairness properties
Here we formally define the fairness properties we discuss in this paper.
Pareto optimality An allocation mechanism is pareto optimal if it returns an allocation x such
that for any other allocation x′, if there exists i ∈ N such that ui(x′i) > ui(xi), then there must
exist j ∈ N such that uj(x′j) < uj(xj). That is, an allocation is pareto optimal if there does not
exist another allocation where some agent is strictly better off without some other agent being
strictly worse off.
Weighted envy freeness ui
(
xj
wi
wj
)
− ui(xi) is how much i envies j. An allocation is weighted
envy free if this quantity is non-positive for any i, j ∈ N :
ui
(
xj
wi
wj
)
≤ ui(xi)
Intuitively, this means an agent prefers her allocation over the allocation of any other agent scaled
by the weight ratio of the two agents.
Strategyproofness In the existing literature, agents can only be strategic by misreporting their
demand vector. In our setting however, the agents have the additional possibility of misreporting
their constraint within each type of resource (e.g. I can report that I accept both Intel and AMD
CPUs but in fact my program only runs on Intel CPU). Our definition of strategyproofness guards
against both types of misreporting.
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Let x be the allocation returned by the mechanism under truthful reporting from all agents.
Let x′ be an allocation returned by the mechanism when all agents report truthfully except agent
i reports an alternative demand vector and/or alternative constraints. The mechanism is strate-
gyproof if ui(xi) ≥ ui(x′i).
Proportionality An allocation x satisfies proportionality if ui(xi) ≥ ui(x′i) for all i, where
x′ir = wiSr.
4 Group Dominant Resource Fairness Allocation
We now present our fair allocation mechanism, which we call Group Dominant Resource Fairness
(GDRF). The mechanism proceeds in rounds and agents are gradually “eliminated”. In each round
t, we use the linear program described in Equation (2) to maximize a fractional value yt so that
each remaining agent i can receive at least a yt×wi fraction of the total supply from its dominant
resource meta-type l∗i , or yt × wi × dil/di∗ fraction of each demanded meta-type l.1 Based on
this solution, we eliminate one or more resources using Definition 1. Then, among the remaining
agents, we eliminate those who have at least one demand group whose resources within have all
been eliminated (Definition 2). For each agent i eliminated in round t, we set γi = yt. We fix
the fraction of dominant meta-type l∗i assigned to agent i as γi × wi, without fixing the specific
allocations of the resources. This differs from the algorithm in [14], which fixes the assignment in
each round. Fixing γi while keeping the allocation flexible is crucial for ensuring Pareto optimality.
We will show that there is at least one new resource being eliminated in each round. Thus our
algorithm requires at mostm rounds (in practice it often terminates in 2-3 rounds even with a large
number of resources types). Furthermore, we will show that each round can be implemented by
solving a polynomial-sized linear program, and thus the overall procedure can be run in polynomial
time.
Let Nt be the set of agents who have not been eliminated at the beginning of round t, Rt be
the set of resources that have not been eliminated at the beginning of round t.
max yt
s.t. yt × wi × d
i
l
di∗
≤
∑
r∈gl
xi,r ∀i ∈ Nt, gl ∈ Gi (allocation constraints)
γi × wi × d
i
l
di∗
≤
∑
r∈gl
xi,r ∀i 6∈ Nt, gl ∈ Gi (2)∑
i∈N
xi,r ≤ Sr ∀r ∈ R (supply constraints)
xir ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, r ∈ R
The allocation constraints are saying that remaining agents need to receive at least yt×wi fraction
of the total supply of their dominant resource meta-type. The eliminated agents only need γi×wi
which were determined in previous rounds. Note that the ratio d
i
l
di∗
is simply making sure that there
is no waste in the allocation. ytwidi∗ and
γiwi
di∗
is the utility for agent i, depending on whether she is
eliminated or not.
1 An alternative is to make each remaining agent receive a yt×wi× dil/di∗ fraction of the total supply from each
of its resource group gl∗i , as agent i can only derive utilities from resources in gl∗i ⊆ Ωl∗i . To do so, we can multiply
the left hand side of the allocation constraints in Equation (2) by
∑
r∈gi
l
Sr. This alternative setup, however, does
not lead to a mechanism with envy-freeness and strategyproofness.
As a simple example, assume that there are five agents 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 of equal weights, one meta-type, and two resource
types A,B that fall under this meta-type, with equal supply. Agent 1, 2 accept only type A; agent 3, 4, 5 accept
only type B. With simple calculation, we have that the largest y1 we can get is 1/3: everyone receives 1/3 of their
accepted supply. The only possible allocation to achieve that is by assigning 1/3 of A each to agents 1,2, and 1/3
of B each to agents 3, 4, 5. However, if agent 2 strategically stated that he could take both A and B, the resulting
allocation would be assigning 1/3 of A to agent 1, 2/3 of A to agent 2, and 1/3 of B each to agents 3, 4, 5. In this
new allocation, the largest y1 is still 1/3, but since the total accepted supply for agent 2 is larger, he receives more.
Furthermore, agent 1 would now envy agent 2.
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Definition 1. Resource r is eliminated when
∑
i∈N
xi,r = Sr for every optimal x.
Definition 2. Agent i is eliminated in round t when there exists gl ∈ Gi such that gl ∩Rt+1 = ∅.
Algorithm 1: Group Dominant Resource Fairness (GDRF)
1 Input: Agents N , resources R, supplies Sr, demand groups Gi ∀i, normalized demands
dgi ∀i ∈ N, g ∈ Gi, normalized weights wi ∀i ∈ N
2 Initialize N0 = N,R0 = R
3 for t← 0, 1, 2, ... do
4 y∗t ← Solve Equation (2)
5 Update the remaining resources Rt+1
6 Update the remaining active agents Nt+1
7 for agent i eliminated in this round do
8 γi ← y∗t
9 end
10 if Nt+1 = ∅ then
11 Solve Equation (2) and assign resources according to xi,r with rounding
12 break
13 end
14 end
First we address the question of whether the GDRF can be efficiently implemented.
Claim 1. For each round t, there exists at least one r ∈ Rt that has to be eliminated.
Proof. Suppose not. Then for each r ∈ Rt, there exists an optimal solution such that
∑
i∈N
xi,r < Sr.
Then the convex combination of these solutions gives us an optimal solution x∗ that satisfies∑
i∈N
x∗i,r < Sr ∀r ∈ Rt.
However, by Definition 2, for every agent i ∈ Nt, and every g ∈ Gi, g ∩ (R \ E) 6= ∅. So if we
assign a little more of every active resource to every active agent, then the overall objective value
would be higher. This contradicts optimality of the LP.
Claim 2. This claim has two parts:
• If the shadow price of a supply constraint is positive then that resource has to be eliminated.
• In each round, at least one supply constraint that corresponds to a resource from the set Rt
has a positive shadow price.
The proof is technical so we defer it to Appendix A. Claim 2 says that we can determine which
resources need to be eliminated by looking at the dual variables of the linear program of that
round.
The two claims above together show that our algorithm can be implemented efficiently by
solving a linear number of polynomial-sized linear programming problems. Now we show that the
mechanism satisfies the four fairness properties. First we note the following fact:
Fact 1. The optimal value for Equation (2) increases over the number of rounds: y∗1 ≤ y∗2 ≤ ...,
where y∗t is the optimal objective function value of the LP in round t.
This follows because we eliminate some agent at every round, and the constraints on eliminated
agents are less restrictive than the constraints on active agents.
Lemma 1. GDRF is Pareto optimal.
Proof. Suppose x is the output of Algorithm 1 and there exists allocation x′ such that agent i is
strictly better off while other agents have just as much as utility.
Let t be the round in which i was eliminated. Since i received y′ > y∗t fraction of its dominant
resource under x′, we can scale back its’ allocation to x′i
yt
y′ . This new solution satisfies all the
constraints of the LP in round t, is optimal, and does not use up all the resources that i cares
about. This contradicts i being eliminated in round t.
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Note that by the same argument as above we know that the allocation constraint in Equation (2)
for the eliminated agents has to be satisfied with equality (otherwise we can scale this allocation
back to make the constraint tight, and that agent would not have been eliminated in an earlier
round):
Fact 2. For any round t, the allocation constraints in Equation (2) for i /∈ Nt have to be tight for
optimal solutions.
This fact effectively says that when an agent is eliminated, her utility in the final allocation
is determined, even though the exact allocation is not. Note that it is crucial to not fix the
allocation of an agent when she is eliminated in order to ensure Pareto optimality because when
an agent is indifferent to a set of resource types, it is important to allocate her the type that is
less demanded by other agents. In other words, agents who are flexible with their demand groups
should accommodate agents who are more restrictive (ex: If agent 1 accepts both type A and B,
and agent 2 only accepts type A, then we should allocate agent 1 mostly type B resource, and leave
type A resource for agent 2). However when the number of meta-types is large, it is difficult to
determine which resources will be in higher demand among the remaining agents. So it’s important
to not fix the allocation of the agents until the very last iteration.
Lemma 2. GDRF is weighted envy free.
Proof. We show that i does not envy j. Let ti, tj be the time when agent i and j are eliminated
respectively.
If tj ≤ ti then by Fact 1 and Fact 2 this means j’s unweighted dominant resource share is less
than or equal to i (y∗tj ≤ y∗ti ). So after adjusting for demand ratio and weights, the absolute units
of allocation of Ωl∗i to agent j must be smaller.
Now we consider the case when tj > ti. Note that y∗t′ ≥ y∗t for any t′ ≥ t. Suppose y∗tj > y∗ti
and that i envies j in the final solution x∗. Note that this implies that xj contains at least one
resource from every group of Gi. Now consider the allocation that scales the allocation to agent
j by the factor
y∗ti
y∗tj
. Such an allocation achieves the optimal value in the optimization problem
in round ti while maintaining slack in at least one resource from each demand group of Gi. This
contradicts Definition 2.
Lemma 3. GDRF is Strategyproof.
Our proof approach is adapted from [14] with major modifications. We first prove two helpful
results. For an arbitrary agent i, let d be the true demand and an alternative demand d′ where
only the element belonging to agent i can be different. Let t∗ be the first round in which agent i
is eliminated, either with truthful or untruthful reporting (minimum of the two). Let Nt and N ′t
represent the agents who have not been eliminated by round t under d and d′ respectively.
Claim 3. If agent i is not eliminated in round t, then if we remove the allocation constraint for
agent i and omit the variables related to agent i from the supply constraints from Equation (2), the
optimal value as well as agents eliminated do not change.
Proof. First we show that xi,r = 0 if r is one of the eliminated resources in that round. Suppose
xi,r > 0. Since i is not eliminated, there must exist another resource r′ in the same demand group
of r for agent i that is not eliminated. This means that we could replace some of the allocation of r
with a little more allocation of r′. But this would then contradict r being an eliminated resource.
Note that by the same logic xi,r = 0 holds in all future rounds too.
This allows us to remove xi,r from the supply constraints. Now the allocation constraint can
be written as
yt × wi × d
i
l
di∗
≤
∑
r∈g∩Rt+1
xi,r ∀i ∈ Nt, gl ∈ Gi
Since the non-eliminated resources are not constrained by supply, this inequality can always
hold without posing limits on other variables. So we can remove this constraint completely.
Claim 4. For all t ≤ t∗, Nt = N ′t. For all t < t∗, y∗t = y∗′t .
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Proof. We use proof by induction. t = 0 holds trivially.
We assume the claim holds for t. Suppose t + 1 < t∗. Then by Claim 3, we can remove the
constraints related to agent i from the optimization problem. But the only differences between
these two optimization problems are those related to agent i, so they have the same solutions and
we are eliminating the same agents.
Now we prove Lemma 3.
Proof. We consider four cases separately.
• y∗t∗ ≤ y∗′t∗ and the agent is eliminated in t∗ reporting d. By Claim 4, we know Nt∗ = N ′t∗ .
Although we don’t know the exact round in which agents in N ′t∗ are eventually eliminated,
we know that their dominant resource shares are all at least y′t∗ ≥ yt∗ , because the optimal
objective value of the optimization problem can only increase over time by Fact 1.
Suppose ui(x′i) > ui(xi). Now consider x′, as a candidate solution for the optimization
problem in round t∗ of truthful reporting. Every agent in Nt∗ satisfies the constraints in
round t∗ with at least y∗′t∗ ≥ y∗t∗ while agent i received strictly more utility. This contradicts
Definition 2.
• y∗t∗ ≥ y∗′t∗ and the agent is eliminated in t∗ reporting d′. Since y′t∗ is the fraction of the total
supply of your dominant resource that you receive, you must be receiving less of that under
d′, even if the reported dominant resource meta-type is different under d′, because then the
fraction of true dominant resource group received must be even less than y′t∗ .
• y∗′t∗ > y∗t∗ and the agent is not eliminated reporting d but is eliminated reporting d′. We
argue that this case cannot happen. By Claim 4, we can remove the allocation constraints
related to i under truthful reporting. But then we are left with two optimization problems
with the same constraints, except that with untruthful reporting the optimization problem
has extra allocation constraint (for agent i), and an extra non-negative term in the supply
constraints. Extra constraints and extra terms in the supply constraints can only make the
optimization problem harder.
• y∗′t∗ < y∗t∗ and the agent is eliminated reporting d but not eliminated reporting d′. This is the
symmetric case as the previous one and so cannot happen either.
Finally, a closer inspection of the above shows that even misreporting the demand group does
not break the argument.
Unfortunately proportionality does not hold generally. We prove proportionality under the
following assumption:
Assumption 1.
min
N ′⊆N,l∈{1...L}
1∑
i∈N ′
widil/d
i∗
×
∑
r∈∪i∈N′gil
Sr ≥ max
i∈N
 minl:dil 6=0
∑
r∈gil
Sr
dil/d
i∗

Intuitively what the condition says is that whenever there is a group of agents who have a large
combined weighted demand on meta-type l, they cannot be too selective about the types within
this meta-type. More concretely, for a given group of agents and a meta-type l, if the total accepted
supply of l is small (the second quantity on the LHS is small), then sum of the weighted normalized
demand for that resource cannot be too big (the denominator in the first fraction should be small).
Note that the utility of a proportional allocation for agent i is min
l:dil 6=0
∑
r∈gi
l
wiSr
dil
. So for a fixed agent i,
the RHS is her utility of a proportional allocation divided by wi/di∗. We leave as an open problem
whether such assumption is necessary for a mechanism that achieves the four fairness desiderata
simultaneously.
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To provide more intuition for this assumption, we look at two examples. First we check that
Example 1 satisfies Assumption 1. The RHS of the assumption evaluates to 1 (with hospital 1 and
resource meta-type 1). One can check that the minimum on the LHS is achieved by picking N ′ = N
and l = 1 which gives us 1615 > 1. Thus Assumption 1 is satisfied. Under this setup, hospital 1
receives 400 type B doctors and 100 type C nurses; hospital 2 receives 100 type A doctors and 400
type C nurses; hospital receives 3 400 type A doctors, 100 type B doctors and 500 type D nurses.
Their utilities are u1 = 100, u2 = 100, u3 = 500. On the other hand, the utilities that the hospitals
receive under proportional allocations are u1 = 62.5, u2 = 31.25, u3 = 250. Clearly our allocation
is better for everyone.
By adjusting the weights of the hospitals we can also get an example that does not satisfy
Assumption 1. Take the same parameters of Example 1 with the following modification on weights:
w1 = 0.49, w2 = 0.49, w3 = 0.02. The RHS value of Assumption 1 does not change. However,
because the weights of hospitals 1, 2 now dominate the market, the minimum of LHS is achieved
with N ′ = {1, 2} and l = 2, which gives us 1/20.49×1+0.49×1/4 < 1. So the assumption is violated.
Intuitively, the problem with this setup is that even though hospitals 1 and 2 account for vast
majority of the weighted demand for the nurse meta-type, they are both severely constrained to
the same half of the total supply or nurses. Under this setup, the algorithm assigns 400 units
of resource B and 100 units of resource C to agent 1 with utility u1 = 100. With proportional
allocation however, agent 1 receives 1000 · 0.49 units of resources A and B and 500 · 0.49 units of
resource C, with utility u1 ≥ 122.
Lemma 4. Assume that demands, weights and supplies are all rational numbers. Then under
Assumption 1, GDRF satisfies proportionality (sharing incentive).
Proof. Let yˆ denote the RHS of Assumption 1. After rearranging we have:
∑
r∈∪i∈N′gil
Sr ≥ yˆ
(∑
i∈N ′
wid
i
l/d
i
∗
)
∀N ′ ⊆ N, l ∈ {1 . . . L}
Now, for every agent i and every meta-type l, consider yˆwidil/d
i
∗ as the “total demand” for
resource meta-type l from agent i.
Then, we construct a bipartite graph as follows: for the left-hand nodes, we create a node
for every  unit of total demand from each agent for each resource meta-type. Thus, each node
is associated with some specific agent i and resource meta-type l. For the right-hand nodes, we
create a node for every  unit of supply of each resource type (r ∈ R). Note that since there are
finite number of agents and resource types, there exists an  small enough that it can perfectly
divide up all the demands and supplies, assuming that all the weights are rational.
Next, we create an edge between each pair of left and right-hand side nodes if and only if the
supply side node belongs to the demand group of that agent for that meta-type: r ∈ gil .
The rearranged variant of Assumption 1 now tells us that for every subset of the demand side
nodes, the number of neighbors of that subset is greater than or equal to the size of the subset.
This is precisely the condition in Hall’s Theorem, which states that if this condition holds, then
there exists a matching in the bipartite graph such that the demand side nodes are covered.
Consider such a matching obtained via Hall’s Theorem. We construct a solution x by setting
xir equal to  times the number of matched edges corresponding to ir. This yields an assignment
that gives each agent at least yˆwidil/d
i
∗ of each meta-type. By the construction of the matching
this is a legal allocation. Then, we can set yt = yˆ, and obtain a feasible solution to (2).
By definition of yˆ, it follows that the utility of each agent after the first round is at least:
dil
di∗
yˆwi
1
dil
=
wi
di∗
yˆ ≥ wi
di∗
min
l:dil 6=0
∑
r∈gil
Sr
dil/d
i∗
= min
l:dil 6=0
∑
r∈gil
wiSr
dil
Note that the right-most quantity is the utility of the proportional allocation. This means that
after the first round, every agent already achieves at least as much utility as the proportional
allocation. Fact 1 finishes the proof.
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4.1 Rounding to obtain an integral allocation
In the preceding analysis, we implicitly assumed that the resources are divisible, and all fairness
results are with respect to the fractional assignment output by our proposed mechanism. In
practice, since resources such as ventilators and volunteers are indivisible, we randomly round the
output of the algorithm to obtain the final assignment. There is literature that focus on the fair
allocation of indivisible goods [6]. Indivisible resource allocation is particularly important when
the quantities of the resources are small (for instance, fairly assigning a car, a house, and a ring
to two people).However, as is the case with most discrete optimization problems, these algorithms
don’t scale well to the sizes that we deal with in a pandemic with tens of thousands of volunteers
/ ventilators, or in the cloud compute setting where each data center contains millions of CPU
cores. Furthermore, in settings where each agent receives hundreds of units of each resource, the
performance loss due to rounding is often small compared to the dramatic increase in computational
cost for solving Mixed Integer programs.
4.2 Extension to arbitrary group structure
We currently assume that resources and demands follow a meta-type/group/type structure. One
might be interested in a general group structure where a demand group can contain any subset of all
possible resources (not necessarily from a single meta-type). The problem with this kind of flexible
group structure is that it opens up possibilities for people to cheat the system by misreporting
their true group structure (e.g.: instead of reporting that you are indifferent to resource A and
B, and that you only need one unit of either one to finish a task, you claim that you need one
unit each from both A and B to finish one task). In particular, Dominant Resource Fairness based
approach will likely not work, since it is unclear how one would even define the dominant resource
under such a general setting. We leave this as an open question for future work.
4.3 Alternative fair allocation mechanism
As discussed in Section 2, the other most suitable approach for multiple resource allocation with
heterogeneous demands is the Maximum Nash Welfare approach. When the weights are equal, it is
also commonly referred to as the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Income (CEEI) approach. It
can be shown that MNW indeed is still a market equilibrium, even with our new group constraints.
However it is known that MNW is not strategyproof (see Section 6 of [9] for an example). Since our
setting is a generalization of the previous setting, this result still holds. We show in the next section
that our GDRF mechanism also works better in practice in terms of implementation complexity.
5 Numerical Experiments
Solving for MNW is an exponential cone program, which until recently did not have a reliable
commercial solver. We implemented the MNW using the MOSEK solver and our GDRF approach
using GUROBI.
The first experiment compares the social welfare level achieved by GDRF and with MNW. We
use the following meta-type structure: Ω1 = {0},Ω2 = {1, 2},Ω3 = {3, 4, 5},Ω4 = {6, 7, 8, 9}. The
group constraints are generated randomly for each agent in each trial. The demands and weights
(before normalization) are sampled uniformly from [1, 10], and the number of agents is n = 5. The
supply for each resource is uniformly sampled from [n × 100, n × 1000]. We ran for 300 trials.
As shown in Figure 2, the bar graph shows that the mean social welfare achieved by the two
algorithms over all trials are very close. The right figure shows the normalized difference in social
welfare between MNW and GDRF, where the normalized difference is defined by the difference
between the social welfare achieved by the two algorithms, divided by the social welfare achieved
by the MNW approach. 95% of the trials have a normalized difference of less than 13%, which
means that in 95% of the times, our algorithm obtained at least 87% of the social welfare achieved
by the MNW approach.
Since our algorithm is envy-free in the fractional setting, we first round the allocation to integral
solutions and then compute the maximum envy for each trial and plot the result in Figure 3. We
define max envy of each instance as the maximum level of envy between any pair of agents for a
given allocation. The experiments show that even after random rounding the envy is very small.
The error bar shows the 25th and 75th percentile.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Mean social welfare over all trials (left) and normalized difference between social welfare
achieved by the two algorithms (right).
Figure 3: Average Max Envy over all trials.
For the next experiment we keep the same meta-type structure but we scale up the number
of agents. We plot the run time for the two algorithms in Figure 4a. The error region represents
one standard deviation from the mean, calculated from 16 iterations. GDRF has noticeably larger
variance in its’ run time. This is because the number of LP’s we are solving in each instance
may vary, while the MNW approach always solve only one optimization problem. Even then, our
approach is significantly faster.
We then fix the number of agents to n = 5, the number of types of resources in each meta-type
to 5, and then scale up the number of meta-types. The supply for each resource is still sampled
from [n × 100, n × 1000] as before. As shown in Figure 4b, our algorithm is orders of magnitude
faster in this setting. The error region is again computed from 16 iterations.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a novel resource allocation mechanism for a generalized demand structure under
Leontief utilities. Our meta-type/type/group demand structure assumes that resources can be
categorized first into meta-types. Then within each meta-type, each agent picks a subset (a group)
that she views as equivalent (substitutes). Resources outside of these groups cannot be allocated
to the agent.
Our linear programming-based mechanism satisfies proportionality (sharing incentives) under
mild conditions, and is Pareto optimal, envy free, and strategyproof. We drew a connection to Hall’s
theorem in our proof of proportionality. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose
a fair resource allocation mechanism with these properties for this general demand structure .
Although maximum Nash welfare approach can be applied to our setting, it is not strategyproof and
requires solving an exponential cone program which is significantly more expensive computationally.
Finally, we leave as future work to design a mechanism that works with more flexible group demand
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Figure 4: Run time comparison of GDRF and MNW.
structures.
References
[1] Hina Arora, TS Raghu, and Ajay Vinze. “Resource allocation for demand surge mitigation
during disaster response”. In: Decision Support Systems 50.1 (2010), pp. 304–315.
[2] HL Barr et al. “Ethical planning for an influenza pandemic”. In: Clinical medicine 8.1 (2008),
p. 49.
[3] Kevin F Boreskie, Patrick E Boreskie, and Don Melady. “Age is just a number–and so is
frailty: Strategies to inform resource allocation during the COVID-19 pandemic”. In: Cana-
dian Journal of Emergency Medicine (2020), pp. 1–3.
[4] Eric Budish. “The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium
from equal incomes”. In: Journal of Political Economy 119.6 (2011), pp. 1061–1103.
[5] Eric Budish et al. “Course match: A large-scale implementation of approximate competitive
equilibrium from equal incomes for combinatorial allocation”. In: Operations Research 65.2
(2017), pp. 314–336.
[6] Ioannis Caragiannis et al. “The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare”. In: ACM
Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC) 7.3 (2019), pp. 1–32.
[7] Edmund Eisenberg and David Gale. “Consensus of subjective probabilities: The pari-mutuel
method”. In: The Annals of Mathematical Statistics 30.1 (1959), pp. 165–168.
[8] Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al. “Fair Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-
19”. In: New England Journal of Medicine 382.21 (2020), pp. 2049–2055. doi: 10.1056/
NEJMsb2005114. eprint: https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsb2005114. url: https://doi.
org/10.1056/NEJMsb2005114.
[9] Ali Ghodsi et al. “Dominant Resource Fairness: Fair Allocation of Multiple Resource Types”.
In: NSDI’11: Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and
Implementation (2011), pp. 323–336.
[10] Ali Ghodsi et al. “Dominant Resource Fairness: Fair Allocation of Multiple Resource Types.”
In: Nsdi. Vol. 11. 2011. 2011, pp. 24–24.
[11] Devansh Jalota, Marco Pavone, and Yinyu Ye. “Markets for Efficient Public Good Alloca-
tion”. In: ArXiv abs/2005.10765 (2020).
[12] Robert K Kanter. “Would triage predictors perform better than first-come, first-served in
pandemic ventilator allocation?” In: Chest 147.1 (2015), pp. 102–108.
[13] Sanjay Mehrotra et al. “A Model for Supply-Chain Decisions for Resource Sharing with an
Application to Ventilator Allocation to Combat COVID-19”. In: medRxiv (2020).
[14] David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Nisarg Shah. “Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness:
Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities”. In: ACM Trans. Econ. Comput. 3.1 (Mar. 2015).
issn: 2167-8375. doi: 10.1145/2739040. url: https://doi.org/10.1145/2739040.
12
[15] Tia Powell, Kelly C Christ, and Guthrie S Birkhead. “Allocation of ventilators in a public
health disaster”. In: Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 2.1 (2008), pp. 20–26.
[16] Robert D. Truog, Christine Mitchell, and George Q. Daley. “The Toughest Triage — Allocat-
ing Ventilators in a Pandemic”. In: New England Journal of Medicine 382.21 (2020), pp. 1973–
1975. doi: 10.1056/NEJMp2005689. eprint: https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2005689. url:
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2005689.
[17] Yisha Xiang and Jun Zhuang. “A medical resource allocation model for serving emergency
victims with deteriorating health conditions”. In: Annals of Operations Research 236.1 (2016),
pp. 177–196.
[18] Ana Zenteno. “Models for managing surge capacity in the face of an influenza epidemic”.
PhD thesis. Columbia University, 2013.
13
A Proof of Claim 2
Proof. The first part is straightforward. Suppose qr is the dual variable for the supply constraint
of r. If qr > 0, then by complementary slackness,
∑
i∈N
xir = Sr for all optimal x.
Let’s first rewrite the linear program solved at time t:
max yt (3)
s.t.−
∑
r∈gl∩Rt
xir+
dil
di∗
wiyt ≤0 ∀i ∈ Nt, gl ∈ Gi (allocation constraints)
−
∑
r∈gl
xir ≤− d
i
l
di∗
γiwi ∀i 6∈ Nt, gl ∈ Gi∑
i∈N
xir ≤Sr ∀r ∈ R (supply constraints)
xir ≥0 ∀i ∈ N, r ∈ R
yt ≥0
This LP is in canonical form, where the objective coefficient vector is cT = [0, ..., 0, 1]. Let
qig be the dual variables that correspond to the allocation constraints, and qr the dual variables
corresponding to the supply constraints. Let y∗t be the value of yt in an optimal solution to
the linear program and let q¯ be the optimal solution to the corresponding dual program. By
complementary slackness we know that q¯>Ay = cy = 1, where Ay is the last column of the primal
constraint matrix. Note that the entries in Ay are either positive or zero. Therefore, q¯ig must be
positive for some i ∈ Nt, g ∈ Gi.
Now, for the same g as above, y∗t > 0 also means that there exists r ∈ g∩Rt such that xir > 0.
By complementary slackness, this means that the dual constraint that corresponds to xir has to
be tight: q¯>Air = cir = 0 where Air is the column of the constraint matrix corresponding to xir
in the primal. Note that entries in Air are either negative or zero except the single entry that
corresponds to the supply constraint of r. Furthermore, Air,ig < 0, where Air,ig is the entry in Air
that corresponds to the row for agent i and demand group g (because r ∈ g). Therefore q¯r must
be positive in order for the equality q¯>Air = 0 to hold (since q¯ig · Air,ig < 0). This concludes the
proof of the second part.
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